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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A FEDERAL
CEILING ON STATE SEVERANCE TAXES
I. INTRODUCTION
The energy crisis of the 1970's confronted industrial
countries with the harsh reality that most energy resources
are finite in supply, and are located in third world countries
which will not hesitate to seek optimal compensation for the
depletion of their resources.1 In the United States, spiraling
energy prices and long gas lines have led to political and eco-
nomic turmoil which has since beleagured the nation. While
heated debate raged among politicians, consumers, oil lobby-
ists, and a myriad of other interest groups, there seemed to be
a consensus that the energy exporting countries were being
unfair,2 that the energy crisis was the cause of most economic
problems,' and consequently that there must be increased
utilization of domestic energy resources." The focus on domes-
tic resources has, however, revealed issues which prompt
closer examination of some of the assumptions regarding the
energy crisis. Nationally, perhaps the most controversial of
these issues is the state severance tax."
States impose severance taxes on the extraction or
processing of natural resources located within their bounda-
ries." Most severance taxes are levied as a percentage of the
extracted resource's value. Historically, severance taxes have
been relatively low-one or two percent of the resource's
value.7 With the increased demand for domestic resources,
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1. See generally D. DAVIS, ENERGY POLITICS (1978).
2. See generally How much to Pay the OPEC Piper?, TIME, Nov. 8, 1976, at 92;
No Tears for OPEC, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 1, 1976, at 69.
3. See, e.g., How OPEC's High Prices Strangle World Growth, Bus. WEEK, Dec.
20, 1976, at 44.
4. See, e.g., Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 8301
(b)3 (1980); Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6201(6) (1976).
5. See generally Note, The Increasing Conflict between State Coal Severance
Taxation and Federal Energy Policy, 57 TEx. L. REV. 675 (1979).
6. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-26-1 to -11 (1975 Supp.).
7. See Link, Political Constraints and North Dakota's Coal Severance Tax, 31
NAT'L TAX J. 263 (1978).
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however, the resource-rich states' started to raise their sever-
ance taxes. For example, Colorado and North Dakota imposed
a new coal severance tax,9 New Mexico increased its uranium
tax,10 and Montana increased its coal severance tax to
30%-the highest in the nation."
The wave of the new or higher severance taxes has been
viewed by the rest of the nation as OPEC-like price hag-
gling.12 Complaining bitterly about the economic impact of
severance taxes,'8 the resource-dependent states claim these
taxes are in direct conflict with our national energy policy."
The resource-producing states contend that added reve-
nues are needed to meet the ever-increasing costs of more in-
tensive mining. These costs include not only societal costs of
boomtowns and environmental costs of mining,' 5 but also in-
creased revenues for the development of alternative economic
bases.' In short, these states seek economically diverse and
viable communities that will prosper after their resource
wealth has been depleted.' 7
8. In general, resource-rich states are states that export significant amounts of
non-renewable natural resources. Most of these states are located in the West, e.g.,
Montana, Colorado, Wyoming, New Mexico, and Texas. Altogether some 33 states
impose severance taxes on various resources. See Court Holds States Free to Set
Resource Taxes, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1981, at B12, col. 1 (late city ed.).
9. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 57-61-01 to -10 (1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-29-106
(1980). Colorado also imposes severance taxes on oil, gas and oil shale. See COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 39-29-101 to -114.
10. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-26-7 (1982 Supp.).
11. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-35-101 to -111 (1981).
12. See Boom in Strip Mining: Windfall for Montana, Washington Post, May
22, 1977, at 1, col. I.
13. "'The people down here are angry' says Mayor Carole McClellan of Austin,
Texas, who complains that Montana's severance tax on coal will cost her city $100
million in higher utility bills over the next 19 years. 'We feel like we are being had.' "
Montana's 30% Severance Tax on Coal Fuels Producer-Buyer Confrontation, Wall
St. J., March 26, 1980, at 19, col. 1.
14. "'It's confiscatory, unfair, unconstitutional,' says Leon Cohan, Detroit
Edison's general counsel. 'And it's in direct conflict with our national energy policy of
using more coal instead of oil.'" Id.
15. According to Senator Baucus of Montana, the purpose of Montana's coal
severance tax is "straight forward: to enable coal mining towns to provide schools,
hospitals, roads, sewers, police and fire protection-basic services so desperately
needed when local populations mushroom with new mining." Taxation of Natural
Resources, VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, Mar. 15, 1980, at 333.
16. "Our severance tax represents a way to develop our resources in a rational
and responsible manner. It prohibits reckless development while encouraging sound
planning for the future." Id.
17. "We must make sure that our future is not part of a massive boom-bust
cycle." Id. at 332. As a Montana Rancher opined, "People are attacking us for doing
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While the two sides have been engaged in name call-
ing-"Rocky Mountain OPEC," echoing back, "neocolonial
exploitation,"-the real confrontation has been taking place
in the courts and in Congress. The resolution of this confron-
tation involves difficult decisions regarding the tenuous bal-
ance between state and federal power. The U.S. Supreme
Court, in its recent decision, Commonwealth Edison v. Mon-
tana,18 seems to have temporarily shifted the decision-making
burden to Congress. Congress, on the other hand, has been
busy debating a bill that would place a 121/2 % ceiling on sev-
erance taxes for coal which is mined from federal lands."' This
comment discusses the constitutionality of such a bill and the
plausibility of some alternatives.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The framers of the United States Constitution sought to
resolve economic problems between the states by delegating to
Congress the power "to regulate Commerce . . . among the
several states ... ."o The affirmative power to regulate com-
merce, however, has become the federal government's single
most powerful regulatory tool-determining the ratio of fed-
eral-state power.2 1 The balance of power has been flexible and
responsive to "the various crises of human affairs."22
During the depression of the 1930's, the balance of power
shifted dramatically in favor of the federal government. In a
series of decisions during the so-called Constitutional Revolu-
tion of 1937, the Supreme Court allowed Congress to restore
and unify the national economy using the commerce power.'9
Congress was given plenary power to protect and advance in-
terstate commerce. 4 Congress, therefore, was authorized to
regulate or prohibit any intra-state activity which substan-
tially affected interstate commerce, 5  regardless of its
something we think is responsible .... Coal-based economies always go to hell.
We're trying to avoid the boom-bust cycle." Supra note 13.
18. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
19. H.R. 1313, 97th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1981); S.178, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
21. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-2 (1978).
22. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
23. See generally R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 180-87 (1960).
24. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1936).
25. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
19831
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triviality.26
In the absence of congressional action, the courts re-
stricted states' interference with the national economy, utiliz-
ing the negative implication 27 of the commerce clause, com-
monly referred to as the dormant commerce clause.2 The
history of the dormant commerce clause may be summarized
as an attempt by the courts to cope with the increasingly so-
phisticated regulations of commercial relationships.29  The
modern dormant commerce clause test was set.forth in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc. :30
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on inter-
state commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld un-
less the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly ex-
cessive in relation to putative local benefits. [citation
omitted]. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the
burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the
26. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (Congress authorized to
regulate a farmer growing wheat for his own consumption on the theory that if the
farmer did not grow it himself, he would have had to purchase the wheat in interstate
commerce).
27. Originally, in the absence of congressional action, the Court defined the
scope of the commerce clause more narrowly. If a state regulation was held valid
under the dormant commerce clause, this did not imply Congress could not prohibit
that regulation under the commerce clause. See Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.,
431 U.S. 265, 282 n.17 (1977). Lately, however, the Court has been hinting strongly
that the scope of commerce is the same under the commerce clause as it is under its
negative implication in the dormant commerce clause. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322, 326 n.2 (1979). Commentators have generally agreed with this trend. See
Comment, Constitutional Limitations on State Severance Taxes, 20 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 887, 893-94 (1980).
28. See generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 256 (1980); L. TRIBE,
supra note 21, at §§ 5-4 to -8.
29. Historically, when commerce was in its fledgling stages, the inquiry under
the dormant commerce clause focused on the purpose of the state regulation, distin-
guishing between the exercise of commerce and police powers. See Gibbons v. Ogden,
20 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1924). As the economy grew, the commerce-police distinction
became clouded because many regulations could be labeled as the exercise of either
power. In dealing with state regulation of its ports, the inquiry turned to the effect of
the regulation, distinguishing between the national and local subjects of such regula-
tion. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851). The expansion of
the nation's railroad system presented another hybrid situation in which the na-
tional-local distinction was of little help. In striking down legislation regulating train
lengths, the Court finally adopted a balancing test which considered the state interest
and the burden on interstate commerce. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S.
761 (1945).
30. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on inter-
state activities.3'
Pike's four prong balancing test considers both the state's in-
terests and the burden on interstate commerce and therefore
is an effective test regardless of the complexity of the
regulations.
III. STATE TAXATION CASES
A. Pre-Montana
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has applied the dor-
mant commerce clause analysis where state involvement with
the national economy took the form of taxation. During the
1920's the Court decided three important resource taxation
cases, known as the Heisler Trilogy.32 In each case, the Court
held that the act of severance, like manufacturing, preceded
the flow of commerce and was therefore a local activity im-
mune to commerce clause scrutiny."3 The Heisler decisions
were prompted by the Court's fear that expansion of the com-
merce power to include products destined for exportation
would nationalize all industries.3 4
A corollary to the "local activity" doctrine was that the
states could tax "local incidents" of interstate business, such
as the generation of power.3 5 The "local incidents" rule, how-
ever, was an exception to the general rule that the privilege of
doing interstate business could not be subject to state taxa-
tion.3 6 In application, the privilege doctrine was handicapped
by its mechanical approach which made the validity of a tax
dependent on its label.3 7
31. Id. at 142.
32. Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927); Oliver Iron Mining Co.
v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
33. rn Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923), the Court held that
"mining is not interstate commerce, but, like manufacturing, is a local business sub-
ject to local regulation and taxation." Id. at 178.
34. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. at 259-60.
35. See, e.g., Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932).
36. See, e.g., Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1 (1910).
37. Compare Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450 (1959) (state taxation of exclusively interstate operations of foreign corporation
upheld) with Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) (state tax-
1983]
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In 1977, the Court finally abandoned the privilege doc-
trine and in accordance with its approach under Pike,
adopted a more flexible test. In Complete Auto Transit Inc. v.
Brady," the Court upheld a Mississippi privilege tax, empha-
sizing that interstate commerce must pay its own way "even
though it increases the cost of doing business. 3 9 In moving
"toward a standard of permissibility of state taxation based
upon its actual effect rather than its legal terminology,"40 the
Court held that a state tax is not invalid if it "is applied to an
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is
fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate
commerce and is fairly related to the services provided by the
State."'41 The four prongs of Complete Auto may be generally
classified under two categories: 1) the state's power to tax;
and 2) the amount of the tax.
1. Power to Tax
The substantial nexus and fair apportionment prongs of
Complete Auto relate to the state's power to tax. The genesis
of these provisions lies in due process considerations. The
substantial nexus prong, for example, requires minimum con-
tacts between the state and the activity taxed, in order to as-
sure the existence of jurisdiction over the taxpayer.' 2 If the
taxpayer is within a state's jurisdiction, taxing him results in a
local impact which serves as a political restraint on the state
legislature.' Excessive taxes that adversely impact a tax-
payer's business also harm the state economy. The political-
check ingredient of Complete Auto is important because it
represents the Court's traditional reliance on the political pro-
cess as a limitation on the legislative powers, at least in the
area of commerce."
Complete Auto's second requirement of a fairly appor-
ation on income of foreign corporation which was engaged exclusively in interstate
trucking held invalid).
38. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
39. Id. at 288 (quoting Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Triangle, 421 U.S. 100, 108
(1974), quoting Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)).
40. 430 U.S. at 281.
41. Id. at 279.
42. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of the State of
Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967); American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451 (1965).
43. See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45 n.2 (1939).
44. See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
[Vol. 23872
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tioned tax embodies the same fairness considerations of due
process. This provision is designed to prevent multiple taxa-
tion of interstate commerce by requiring that the tax rate be
proportional to the in-state business of the taxpayer. 5
The non-discrimination third prong of Complete Auto
represents the same fairness concerns of due process, but it is
also closely linked to the commerce clause, the very purpose
of which "was to create an area of free trade among the sev-
eral States."'46 In practice, non-discrimination eliminates taxes
that directly benefit local business and thereby prevents bal-
kanization of the states.47 The Court, in considering this
prong, examined the state's total tax structure including the
"various tax credits and exclusions. ' 4 8
2. The Amount of Tax
The final requirement of Complete Auto is that the tax
must be fairly related to the sources provided by the state.
Until recently, this factor was thought to limit the amount of
the tax. The Montana" decision, however, seems to have dis-
carded this factor altogether. To understand Montana's im-
pact, a discussion of prior case law is necessary.
A limitation on the amount of tax logically stems from
the extent of the contacts between the state and the taxed
activity. Prior to Montana, the Court seemed to be leaning
towards this reasoning. As explained in Wisconsin v. J.C.
Penney Co.,50 the question is whether the state has provided
any services for which it can ask payment. 1 An inquiry under
the fair-relationship factor, therefore, "would include not only
direct government services such as police and fire protection,
but the less obvious support of a trained workforce which
helps mold a civilized society."' 2 Conversely, the state could
exact "from interstate commerce its fair share of the cost of
45. See Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
46. McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co. 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944).
47. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 462
(1959); Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 74 (1963); Boston Stock Ex-
change v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977).
48. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 756 (1981).
49. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
50. 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
51. Id. at 444.
52. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 445 (1979).
1983] 873
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state government."' Is
In application, however, the Court appeared unwilling to
calculate the dollar value of these state services. For example,
in upholding the state of Washington's 1 % tax on stevedoring
activities, the Court quickly determined that the fourth prong
was satisfied by simply stating: nothing in the record sug-
gested that the tax was not fairly related to state provided
services.54 The failure to expand the fair relationship require-
ment prompted some commentators to develop formulas for
measuring cost-based tax rates." It was against this back-
ground that the controversy over Montana's 30% coal tax
arose.
B. Montana Case
The states of Montana and Wyoming hold some 40% of
the coal reserves in the United States and 68% of the low-
sulfur coal." The environmental pollution restrictions enacted
in the 1970's greatly enhanced the value of and demand for
the low-sulfur western coal. Montana and Wyoming exported
80% of their coal.57 Since 1921, Montana has imposed a nomi-
nal tax on coal mined on state and federal lands. In 1975
Montana increased its coal severance tax rate on the surface
mining of coal with a heating quality of 7000 Btu per pound
or greater to 30% of the contract price.8 This caused a sharp
increase in tax revenues which has continued due to the high
demand for low-sulfur coal.0 ' In fact, in 1976 the Montana
Constitution was amended to create a trust fund for 50% of
the severance tax revenues.60
In 1978, several coal producers and utility companies
sued the state of Montana, seeking an injunction against fur-
53. Department of Revenue of Washington v. Association of Washington Steve-
doring Co., 435 U.S. 734, 748 (1978).
54. Id. at 751.
55. See Comment, An Outline for Development of Cost-Based State Severance
Taxes, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 913 (1980).
56. H.R. REP. No. 1527, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REPORT].
57. Id.
58. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-103 (1981). Wyoming has raised its coal severance
tax to 171/2 % from its prior level of 2%. Wvo. STAT. § 39-6-303 (1981).
59. The following dollar amounts constituted Montana's coal severance tax rev-
enues: $42 million in 1979 and approximately $80 million in 1980. Supra note 13.
60. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 5.
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ther coal taxes. The plaintiffs' primary claim was that the tax
was invalid under the commerce clause. The lower court up-
held the tax and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed." In
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,62 a divided Court"
held that Montana's tax did not violate the commerce clause
because it "comport[ed] with the requirements of the Com-
plete Auto Transit test.""' As expected,6 the Court rejected
Heisler's "local activity" test and emphasized instead the sub-
stantiality of the "practical effects" of severance taxes on in-
terstate commerce." The Montana decision appears to have
significantly modified Complete Auto and its progeny, raising
interesting questions concerning the treatment of severance
taxes under the dormant commerce clause.
The Court briefly dealt with Complete Auto's first and
second prongs. It was clear that the taxpayer's only nexus
with the state was the taxed activity, namely, severance of
coal in Montana. Also, there was no possibility of multiple
taxation because the severance occurred only in Montana.
The Court held furthermore, that Montana's tax was non-
discriminatory because it used the same rate regardless of the
coal's destination. The appellants unsuccessfully argued that
because of its large exports, Montana, in effect, had shifted
the tax burden onto the consuming states, thus discriminating
against commerce. Noting that a similar claim was rejected in
Heisler, the Court stressed that to declare a tax discrimina-
tory because of a state's position of monopoly would require
an unwarranted departure from the commerce clause's basic
purpose of creating an arena of free trade among the states."
Implicit in the concept of free trade is that one state has no
right of access to the resources of another state at reasonable
prices.6  The Court's strong advocacy of free trade, however,
61. - Mont. -, 615 P.2d 847, a/d, 453 U.S. 609 (1980).
62. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
63. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Marshall, Brennan, Stewart and Rehnquist
made up the majority. Justice White concurred and Justices Blackmun, Powell and
Stevens dissented.
64. 453 U.S. at 629.
65. Commentators had predicted the rejection of Heisler's analysis. See, e.g.,
Browde & DuMars, State Taxation of Natural Resource Extraction and the Com-
merce Clause: Federalism's Modern Frontier, 60 OR. L. REv. 7, 40 (1981).
66. 453 U.S. at 614-17.
67. Id. at 617.
68. Id. at 618-19.
69. "[W]e are not convinced that the Commerce Clause, of its own force, gives
1983] 875
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was undermined when it pointed out that "formidable eviden-
tiary difficulties" prevent the application of antitrust laws. 0
After concluding that the tax was non-discriminatory, the
Court proceeded to reject the appellants' argument that the
fourth prong required that the amount of tax be fairly related
to the cost of the state services furnished. The Court, follow-
ing the Montana Supreme Court's analysis,71 pointed out that
the question was not the amount of tax, but the power to tax.
Once there was sufficient nexus with the state, the taxpayer
was liable not only for the cost of his activities but for the
government's general support. In return, the only benefit to
the taxpayer "[was] that derived from his enjoyment of the
privileges of living in an organized society, established and
safeguarded by the devotion of taxes to public purpose.17 To
reemphasize that the "amount" of tax was not the issue, the
Court insisted that "the words 'amount' and 'value' were not
even used" in its decisions7S indicating the Court's sensitivity
to the confusion over its treatment of the fourth prong.
Analytically, the fourth prong is divided into two parts.
First, "the interstate business must have a substantial nexus
with the state . . . . 7 But, this requirement is identical to
the first prong. Although the Court admitted that the two
tests were "closely connected," it stopped short of explaining
their differences, if any existed.7 5 If the nexus test is met, the
second part requires that the "measure of the tax must be
reasonably related to the extent of the contract .... ,,r This
part is a subcategory of Complete Auto's second prong which
requires the tax to be fairly apportioned to the taxpayer's in-
tra-state activities.
To illustrate this relationship, consider a taxpayer who
owns a nationwide business which grosses $10 million annu-
the residents of one State the right to control in this fashion the terms of resource
development and depletion in a sister state." Id. at 619.
70. Id. n.8.
71. See - Mont. -, -, 615 P.2d 847, 855-56 (1980).
72. 453 U.S. at 623 (quoting Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S.
495, 521-23 (1937)).
73. 453 U.S. at 625 n.15.
74. Id. at 626.
75. The Court cited the same precedent for the first prong and the first part of
the fourth prong; see National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of the
State of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
76. 453 U.S. at 626.
[Vol. 23
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ally, $2 million of which is from business done in state X.
Under the fair apportionment prong, State X may impose a
tax only on that portior of the taxpayer's business that gener-
ates the $2 million. Under the second part of the fourth
prong, however, the tax rate must be reasonably related to the
taxpayer's extent of contact with State X, i.e., the $2 million
worth of business, so that" 'the incidence of the tax as well as
its measure [must be] tied to the earning which the State...
has made possible . . . .'" The simplest way to satisfy this
test is to tax that percentage of the taxpayer's income which
is derived from the state. In fact, most severance taxes, in-
cluding Montana's coal tax, are measured as a percentage of
the value of the mineral taken.
The Montana analysis signaled a green light for sever-
ance taxes. Most resource-rich states are scarcely populated
and export the bulk of their resources. These states, therefore,
can easily impose a uniform tax using a rate equivalent to a
percentage of the value of the minerals severed7 8 thereby sat-
isfying the dormant commerce clause.
The question at the heart of the controversy, however,
has remained unanswered. All interested parties want to know
the limits of a severance tax rate. There are two very general
limitations. First, the tax must be a general revenue tax "im-
posed for the general support of the government. ' '7 9 Conse-
quently, taxes like "user taxes" imposed for the use of state
facilities do not qualify and must be a general measure of the
taxpayer's benefit. But problems may be avoided by labeling
the tax as general revenue because the Court will defer to
such a legislative characterization.o Moreover, general reve-
nue has been viewed broadly to include "tax revenues for use
by the future generation."8 The second general limitation
mandates that a percentage tax may not be "so arbitrary as to
[constitute], in substance and effect, the direct exertion of a
different and forbidden power, as, for example the confisca-
77. Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 446 (1940)).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 6-10.
79. 453 U.S. at 621 (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co., v. Montana, - Mont.
-, -, 615 P.2d 847, 856 (1980)).
80. The Court actually noted it would defer to the characterization used by the
Montana Supreme Court. Id. The Montana Supreme Court, however, deferred to the
legislature. - Mont. at -, 615 P.2d at 856. Thus, it is reasonable to assume the U.S.
Supreme Court would also defer to the state legislatures.
81. 453 U.S. at 621 n.11.
1983]
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tion of property. '8 2 A tax therefore is arguably invalid if it
forces the taxpayer out of business.
The Court has chosen not to interfere with the severance
taxes. The reason for this course of action is twofold. The
Court has always been concerned with the impracticalities of
deciding a proper tax rate.83 As the Montana Supreme Court
bluntly stated: "[I]t is impossible for any court to foot up the
dollar cost of the government benefits [received by a tax-
payer.]"8 Apart from judicial difficulties in setting tax rates,
such tasks have been appropriately handled by the legisla-
tures. The political process is better equipped to absorb in-
puts from different interests, which results in equitable
solutions.8
5
The second reason for the Court's refusal to pass judg-
ment on a tax rate is that it "would involve abandonment of
the most fundamental principle of government-that it exists
primarily to provide for the common good."88 In other words,
the government could not function if it had to tax individuals
according to the value of the benefits they receive.8 7
IV. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
With the courts out of the picture, the opponents of sev-
erance taxes have turned to Congress as their "last resort."88
The prospect of other states raising their taxes in light of the
Montana decision has been an added worry.8 9 In fact, while
the Supreme Court was considering Montana's coal tax, Mon-
tana was considering taxing platinum right "back into the
82. Id. at 627 n.17 (quoting Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934)). See
also United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953). See generally L. TRIBE, supra
note 21, at § 5-9.
83. As the Court noted in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S.
434, 455 (1979), the commerce clause "does not call for mathematical exactness nor
for the rigid application of a particular formula . (quoting Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 325 (1943)).
84. - Mont. at -, 615 P.2d at 855.
85. See generally Bickel, Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40
(1963); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 10 (1959).
86. 453 U.S. at 623 (quoting Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S.
495, 521-23 (1937)).
87. 453 U.S. at 627 n.16.
88. A Drive to Cap Severance Taxes, Bus. WEEK, July 27, 1981, at 94.
89. See Court Holds States Free to Set Resource Taxes, N.Y. Times, July 3,




In 1980, a bill was introduced in the 96th Congress pur-
porting to place a ceiling of 121/2 % on state severance taxes.91
Reported favorably by the House Subcommittee on Energy
and Power," the bill died in the House Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs. In 1981, during the 97th Congress, an
identical bill was introduced, supported by more than forty
congressmen." While the congressmen of the resource-rich
states prepared for an "ambush," 94 the White House appeared
to be a much needed friend. In fact, support from the White
House was strong enough to convince a reluctant Justice
White to concur in the Montana decision.9" Thus, even
though the chances of the bill becoming law are at best medi-
ocre, the possibility of such a congressional action poses sig-
nificant legal issues which the Supreme Court will have to
settle.
A. Commerce Clause
The proposed bill, H.R. 1313 would amend the Power-
plant and Industrial Fuel Act of 1978 to limit severance taxes
to coal which is destined for shipment in interstate commerce
for use by any major fuel burning installation." By limiting
severance taxes to 121/2 %, the bill purports to alleviate the
national energy crisis, reduce dependence on oil imports, en-
90. Bus. WEEK, March 2, 1981 at 25.
91. H.R. 6625, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 6654, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980); H.R. 7163, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
92. See H.R. REPORT, supra note 56.
93. H.R. 1313, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). The companion bill in the Senate
was S. 178, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
94. Taxation of Natural Resources, supra note 15.
95. "[W]e are counseled by the Executive Branch ... not to overturn the Mon-
tana tax . . . ." 453 U.S. at 637 (White, J. concurring).
96. H.R. 1313 reads in relevant part:
[T]he Congress finds that, in order to alleviate the national energy
emergency, reduce national dependence on petroleum imports, en-
courage the highest and best use of domestic petroleum and natural gas,
and enhance interstate commerce by promoting increased reliance on
our national reserves of coal for the generation of electricity and power,
it is necessary to remove excessive burdens on production of coal used in
powerplants and major fuel-burning installations.. . . [A]ny coal which
is destined for shipment in interstate commerce for use in any power-
plant or major fuel-burning installation, the sum of all severance taxes
or fees . . . levied . . . by a State . . .shall not exceed a total of 12/2
percent of the value of such coal . . ..
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courage use of domestic oil and gas, and enhance interstate
commerce.
The proponents and opponents of H.R. 1313 agree that
the only source of constitutional power for enacting such a bill
lies in the commerce clause. The question then becomes
whether Congress can limit state severance taxes under the
commerce power. As noted earlier, Congress may regulate or
prohibit any activity which substantially affects interstate
commerce. 7 The Court must defer to a congressional finding
that there is a substantial effect on commerce if there is any
rational basis for such a finding." Furthermore, the means
chosen by Congress must be reasonably related to the ends
sought by the congressional action.9 Regarding the reasona-
bleness of the means, the Court also defers to congressional
judgment.
In light of Congress' plenary power to regulate commerce
and the Court's passive role, it would appear unlikely that the
Court would invalidate a limiting bill such as H.R. 1313. Upon
close examination of the facts pertaining to the possible ef-
fects of severance taxes on interstate commerce, however, a
finding of "any" rational basis becomes very difficult. More-
over, some recent commerce clause decisions indicate a non-
deferential approach by a minority of the Court. Finally, a
federal limitation on state taxation is unprecedented, if not
unconstitutional, which is another reason for the Court not to
set a dangerous precedent in the climate of New Federalism.
1. Rational Basis Test
In the recent decision of Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min-
ing & Reclamation Ass'n,'"0 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Rec-
lamation Act of 1977. It held that Congress had a "rational
basis for concluding surface coal mining had substantial ef-
97. In a few recent cases, the Court appears to have dropped the requirement of
a "substantial" effect on interstate commerce. The cases lack consistency, however.
As a suspicious Justice Rehnquist conceded, "[i]t may be that I read too much into
the Court's choice of language." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 312 (1981).
98. Id. See also Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
99. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 324 (1981).
100. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
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fects on interstate commerce."' 0 1 In his concurring opinion,
Justice Rehnquist appeared to be planting the seeds for a
closer review by the future Court in suggesting that commerce
power may be restricted in two ways.' 012
First, regarding the requirement that the regulated activi-
ties impact on interstate commerce, Justice Rehnquist
pointed out that "some nexus" or a "trivial impact" is insuffi-
cient. Instead, a substantial effect on interstate commerce was
required. He further suggested a non-deferential review of
congressional findings, noting that "simply because Congress
may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects
interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so. Congress'
findings must be supported by a 'rational basis' and are re-
viewable by the Courts."' 03 Justice Rehnquist would neverthe-
less defer to Congress' choice of means in effectuating the
regulation.104
In application, the requirement of a rational basis, as op-
posed to any rational basis, would involve an exhaustive anal-
ysis of "Congress' articulated justifications for the exercise of
its power under the commerce clause . ."05 As an example,
Justice Rehnquist cited the majority's approach in Hodel.
There, however, the Court merely recited Congress' express
findings and the legislative history. Perhaps the fact that the
legislature considered the challenged statute for six years,
mitigated the "exhaustive" analysis Justice Rehnquist sug-
gested. Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist, the Chief Justice and
perhaps Justice O'Connor would certainly review congression-
al findings carefully looking for a rational basis, with the pos-
sibility of disagreeing with Congress' conclusions.10 6
Review of the legislative material compiled in H.R.
1313,107 suggests the minority would strike down the bill and
101. Id. at 280.
102. Id. at 305. In a separate concurring opinion the Chief Justice agreed with
Justice Rehnquist's analysis.
103. Id. at 311. Note that under the majority's approach, the Court would probe
the legislative history or record for any rational basis; on the other hand, Justice
Rehnquist requires a congressional finding of an explicit rational basis.
104. Id. at 311.
105. Id.
106. Cf., e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing) (Court held Congress can regulate loan sharking because it adversely affects in-
terstate commerce).
107. See Proposed Amendments to the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use
Act of 1978: Hearings on H.R. 6625, H.R. 6654 and H.R. 7163 Before the Subcomm.
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it is highly likely the majority would concur. The subcommit-
tee report 8 summarized congressional findings and contained
several possible rational bases. It should be noted at the out-
set, however, that nowhere in the report is there a finding that
severance taxes above 121/2 % substantially affect interstate
commerce.
The subcommittee on Energy and Power found that in-
creased coal severance tax rates resulted in a reduction in coal
production.10 9 Coal is usually purchased pursuant to long-
term contracts that require substantial investments in trans-
portation and processing equipment, rendering a change of
supplier impractical." 0 Coal purchasers, therefore, are fre-
quently unable to shop around for lower prices. The subcom-
mittee reasoned that lack of market mobility together with
high severance taxes discouraged investments in coal, thereby
reducing production. A decrease in domestic energy supply
should increase the demand for foreign oil, resulting in a
higher national trade deficit.
This conclusion, however, has no rational basis. Higher
severance taxes have not, in fact, discouraged investment or
reduced coal production. Coal buyers have always been aware
of the possibility of increasing severance taxes; coal contracts
routinely provide for the increases in severance taxes to be
borne by consumers."' Moreover, Montana, for example, has
experienced rapid growth in its coal production since the early
1970's.111 This rate of growth remained unaffected by the
sharp increase of severance taxes in 1975. Although a decline
in production occurred during the 1977-1978 period, it was
caused by a nationwide coal strike which depressed coal pro-
duction. There is no evidence of lack of investment interest in
Montana's coal. Since the imposition of the 30% tax, at least
two major utility companies have signed 25 year contracts
with Montana coal producers. " ' The demand for western coal
on Energy and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
96th Cong. 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Hearings].
108. See H.R. REPORT, supra note 56.
109. Id. at 4.
110. See Holmes, Negotiating, Drafting, and Enforcing Coal Supply Contracts,
9 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 353 (1976).
111. See H.R. REPORT, supra note 56, at 4.
112. Id. at 21.
113. The two companies were Detroit Edison and Houston Lighting & Power
Co. See H.R. Hearings, supra note 107 (statement of W. Christiansen).
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continues despite severance taxes because it is the cheapest
coal in the nation." 4 In short, an increase in coal production
and continued investment in coal contradict the argument
that high severance taxes frustrate the national energy policy
and create higher trade deficits.
Secondly, the subcommittee found that higher severance
taxes increase consumers' utility bills. This finding is also to-
tally unsupported by the facts. Even though the increase in
severance taxes is passed on to the consumers, the impact is
minimal. According to some estimates severance taxes add
only half of 1 % to utility bills as compared to a 5% increase
for sales taxes." 5
In the long run, an increase in utility bills is even benefi-
cial to interstate commerce. It is no secret that energy con-
sumption in the United States has been needlessly wasteful."'
Numerous studies have shown that increased energy costs en-
couraged conservation." 7 Not only does conservation mini-
mize the waste of the nation's coal reserves, but it benefits
commerce by ensuring a longer period of coal usage through-
out the nation. Conservation, however, may only harm utility
companies with long term contracts; they-have to wait longer
to recover their investment. It is not surprising that utility
companies were among the plaintiffs in Montana. It would in-
deed be irrational to conclude that severance taxes affect com-
merce where only a handful of utility companies are affected.
Finally, the subcommittee suggested that excessive sever-
ance taxes result in budget surpluses in some states, at the
expense of other states. Retaliation based on regionalism,
therefore, may occur which could conceivably interfere with
interstate commerce." 8 The argument of regionalism is not
only unfounded, but the implementation of regionalism is ille-
gal. One of the primary reasons for drafting the commerce
clause was the prevention of economic warfare among the
114. Id.
115. See H.R. Hearings, supra note 107 (statements of D. Ostendorf & W.
Christiansen).
116. See D. DAVIS, ENERGY POLITICS 1 (1974); Leapman, America: The World's
Greediest Guzzler, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1979, at 14F, col. 3 (late city ed.).
117. See Hershey, Winning the War on Energy, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1981, at 1,
sec. 3, col. 1 (late city ed.); Energy Price Effects, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1982, at 16F,
col.3 (late city ed.).
118. See H.R. REPORT, supra note 56, at 6.
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states. 1" 9 The Union has not been beset by retaliation over the
numerous severance taxes already in existence. Imposition of
a ceiling on severance taxes of western states would most cer-
tainly create far more regionalism. 20 Such federal action
would be resented by the western states and would set a dan-
gerous precedent.
It is evident that none of the subcommittee's conclusions
regarding reduction in coal production, significant increase of
utility bills and regionalism, are supported by a rational basis.
In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. Severance taxes, when
viewed in light of the nation's energy needs and other factors,
have a trivial impact upon interstate commerce, and may ac-
tually benefit the economy.
2. "In" Commerce Limitation
Justice Rehnquist's second suggestion in his Hodel con-
currence, with regard to restricting the commerce clause, was
an interesting new version of an old idea. During the 1920's
while the "substantial impact" test was in its infancy,' 2' the
Court was experimenting with the "current of commerce" test
in trying to expand the reach of the commerce power. Justice
Holmes first used the current of commerce test in Swift & Co.
v. United States.'22 He emphasized that some local activities
were subject to the commerce power because they could be
viewed as "in" commerce or as an integral part of the "current
of commerce." Applying this rationale, the Court held that
under the Sherman Act Congress had the power to stop price
fixing by meat dealers whose cattle were "sent for sale from a
place in one State, with the expectation that they [would] end
their transit, after purchase in another . . . ."I" The current
of commerce theory was used several more times and was in-
formally abandoned after the birth of the substantial effect
test. 2 "
In light of its traditional use to expand the reach of the
commerce clause, the question arose as to how the "current of
119. See Browde & DuMars, supra note 65, at 12.
120. See H.R. Hearings, supra note 107, at 134-64 (statement of Governer
Herschler of Wyoming).
121. The origin of the "substantial effect" test is in the Shreveport Rate case.
Houston E. & W. Texas R.R. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1941).
122. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
123. Id. at 398.
124. See, e.g., Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
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commerce" theory could be used to limit the clause. The an-
swer lies in its negative implication, as phrased by Justice
Rehnquist that, "[s]ome activities may be so private or local
in nature that they simply may not be in commerce. 12 5 Be-
cause of the limited application of the current of commerce
rationale, the scope of its negative implication is
undetermined.
One point seems to be clear, however; there is no neces-
sary correlation between the "substantial effect" and "current
of commerce" theories. 1" The two approaches yield the same
results when applied to certain facts, but yield different re-
sults when applied to other situations. In other words, an ac-
tivity may not be in commerce but it may have a substantial
effect on commerce.12 7 For example, consider the negative im-
plication of Swift: Cattle that are not destined for shipment in
interstate commerce are not in commerce, but because of dis-
ease or limited pasturage such cattle may substantially affect
the cattle destined for interstate commerce and thus affect
commerce.I28
In applying the "in" commerce limit to severance taxes, it
may be argued that the minerals go through two stages before
entering commerce. First, they are extracted from the land
and become the personal property of the producer. Secondly,
the producer sells them to the purchasers. Severance taxes are
imposed on the extraction of minerals in advance of any entry
of the minerals into commerce.'29
The possible inconsistencies with other aspects of com-
merce clause analysis may prove the "in" commerce limit use-
less. A potential litigant, however, should be aware of the fact
that at least three Justices favor such a limit and perhaps a
125. Hodel v. Virginia, Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 310
(1981).
126. Compare Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) with National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Usery overruled Wirtz's holding but not its
analysis.
127. See, e.g., United States v. Rock Royal Co-Operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533
(1939).
128. Cf., The Beef Research and Information Act of 1976, 7 U.S.C. § 2901-2918
(1976). Section 2901 states in part: "Cattle, beef and beef products move in interstate
and foreign commerce and those which do not move in such channels of commerce
directly burden or affect interstate commerce . .. ."
129. See - Mont. -, -, 615 P.2d, 847, 857. (1980).
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few more may be convinced after further developments.
3. Unprecedented Action
In considering the constitutionality of H.R. 1313, the
Court should keep in mind that limiting state taxes in such a
fashion is "totally without precedence"' 0 and may in fact be
unconstitutional. Judging from the dicta in Montana, how-
ever, the Court seemed to welcome congressional action. Em-
phasizing that the legislatures should set tax rates, the Court
noted that in the context of federalism, "the determination is
to be made by state legislatures in the first instance and, if
necessary, by the Congress, when particular state taxes are
thought to be contrary to federal interests."'' Justice White
agreed in his concurring opinion, noting that "[tihe constitu-
tional authority and the machinery . . . are available to Con-
gress ... ."132 Justice Blackmun, dissenting, not only agreed
that Congress had the power to restrict state taxes, but
opined that if Congress did nothing, "strong policy and insti-
tutional considerations suggest that it was appropriate that
the Court consider this issue."' 33
A review of the case law paints a different picture. In gen-
eral, Congress has the power to prohibit state taxation that
substantially affects interstate commerce. The power to pro-
hibit has been exercised over a variety of state taxes or fees.
For example, in 1871, Congress prohibited state pilot charges
on steamships with federally licensed pilots. The Court up-
held this prohibition in Spraigne v. Thompson. 34 In 1975, the
Federal Securities Acts were amended to prohibit state taxa-
tion of certain stock share transfers made through the facili-
ties of a registered agent located in the state.'35 In Boston
Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission," " the Court sub
silentio upheld this amendment.'
37
It may be argued that the power to prohibit implies the
power to limit. Indeed, prohibition is limitation taken to its
extreme. Thus, the opponents of severance taxes would argue
130. See H.R. Hearings, supra note 107, at 51 (statement of M. Greely).
131. 453 U.S. at 628.
132. Id. at 638.
133. Id. at 652 n.19.
134. 118 U.S. 90 (1886).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 78b(d) (1976) (amending § 28 of the Securities Act of 1934).
136. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
137. Id. at 321 n.4.
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that if Congress has the power to prohibit severance taxes, it
certainly can limit them.1 38 The fallacy in this reasoning, how-
ever, becomes apparent upon a close examination of the case
law, particularly the recent decision of Arizona Public Ser-
vices Co. v. Snead.'3 9
A. The Right To Tax
The Supreme Court in Arizona invalidated New Mexico's
electricity tax. New Mexico imposed a severance tax on the
generation of electricity within the state.140 The tax, roughly
2% of the retail value, applied to each net kilowatt hour of
generated electricity."' In 1976, Congress enacted the Tax
Reform Act which prohibits states from taxing the generation
of electricity in a manner which discriminates against out-of-
state consumers.1 2
Relying on the Tax Reform Act, the owners of several
power plants sued New Mexico, alleging discrimination. Al-
though the tax rate was uniform, discrimination resulted be-
cause the state allowed the electricity tax to be credited
against the gross receipts tax if the electricity was consumed
within the state. New Mexico argued that its electricity tax
was beyond the reach of the commerce clause. In rejecting
New Mexico's argument, the U.S. Supreme Court found that
Congress had plenary power to prohibit state taxation of elec-
tricity generation. After examining the legislative history and
record, the Court concluded that "Congress had a rational ba-
sis for finding that New Mexico's tax interfered with inter-
state commerce and selected a reasonable method to eliminate
that interference."" 43
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 prohibited, not limited, dis-
criminatory severance taxes. Congress could have achieved
equality in tax treatment by imposing a ceiling on the tax rate
for out-of-state consumers so as to compensate them for the
tax credits available for electricity consumed in-state. Instead
Congress chose a flexible standard which restricted New Mex-
ico's method or "means" of taxation and not the amount or
138. See H.R. REPORT, supra note 56, at 11.
139. 441 U.S. 141 (1979).
140. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-34-1 to 6 (1975 Supp.).
141. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932).
142. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455 § 2121(a), 90 Stat. 1914 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 391 (1976)).
143. 441 U.S. at 150.
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the "ends" of its tax objective. The Court seemed to rely im-
plicitly on this distinction noting that:
The generation of electricity in the Four Corners region
undoubtedly also generates environmental and other
problems for New Mexico. There is no indication that
Congress intended to prevent the State from taxing the
generation of electricity to pay for solutions to these
problems .... Congress required only that New Mexico,
if it chooses to tax the generation of electricity for con-
sumption ... tax it equally .... ""
The distinction between congressional restriction over the
means employed for taxation by the state as opposed to re-
strictions over the ends or the amount of the revenue, is also
implicit in the Montana case. The Court relied in part on two
cases for the proposition that Congress may regulate state
taxes if such taxes are contrary to federal interests. In Moor-
man Manufacturing Co. v. Bain,145 the Court noted that the
commerce clause "would amply justify the enactment of legis-
lation requiring all States to adhere to uniform rules for the
division of income."'14 More specifically, in Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Texas,14 7 the Court indicated that "Congress
in the future may see fit to enact legislation requiring a uni-
form method for state taxation of foreign dividends. 1 48 One
can conclude, therefore, that under the commerce clause, Con-
gress may only be able to regulate the method of state
taxation.
This conclusion does not necessarily negate Congress'
power to regulate the amount of revenue sought to be raised
by a state. Of course, control over the taxation method may
indirectly affect the amount of revenue eventually raised. But
state's are allowed the freedom of choosing an appropriate
means of raising the same revenues. There is, however, a more
fundamental reason other than lack of freedom. At the heart
of the distinction between "means" and "ends" lies one of the
most important constitutional principles: the source of federal
power is limited to the delegated powers in the Federal Con-
stitution whereas there is no such limitation on the states'
144. Id. at 150-51.
145. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
146. Id. at 280 (emphasis added).
147. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
148. Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
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source of power. '49 Neither Congress nor the states may exer-
cise their power in a manner prohibited by any provisions of
the U.S. Constitution.1 5 0 Moreover, pursuant to the Constitu-
tion, Congress may choose to restrict the states' exercise of
power but Congress may not restrict the source of that
power.15' In other words, Congress may only exert control over
the "means" of state action and not over the "ends" sought by
such action.
The same analysis applies to taxation. Raising revenues
through taxation falls under the states' power or right to tax.
The manner or means of taxation is an exercise of the right or
power to tax. The right to tax "exists apart from constitu-
tions"' 5 2 whereas its exercise is subject to legislative control.
These principles were first enunciated in the landmark case
McCulloch v. Maryland.'5 3 As Justice Marshall noted:
That the power of taxation is one of vital importance;
that it is retained by the states; that it is not abridged by
the grant of similar power to the government of the
Union; that it is to be concurrently exercised by the two
governments-are truths which have never been denied.
But such is the paramount character of the constitution,
that its capacity to withdraw any subject from the action
of even this power, is admitted.'54
Justice Marshall proceeded to offer an example of an ex-
pressly "withdrawn subject" of states' power to tax, namely,
the constitutional prohibition of imposing duties on imports
or exports. In establishing the full scope of the supremacy
clause, Justice Marshall indicated that a state may be re-
strained "from such other exercise of [the taxing] power, as is
in its nature incompatible with, and repugnant to, the consti-
tutional laws of the Union.' 1 55
Once the differences between the power to tax (ends) and
exercise of that power (means) becomes clear, the difference
149. L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at § 5-2.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 71 AM. JUR. 2d State and Local Taxation § 71 (1973) (citing Miles v. De-
partment of Treasury, 209 Ind. 172, 199 N.E. 372, appeal dismissed, 206 U.S. 640
(1936); People ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 184 N.Y. 431, 77 N.E. 970, afl'd, 204 U.S.
152 (1906)).
153. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
154. Id. at 425 (emphasis added).
155. Id. (emphasis added).
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between the power to limit and the power to prohibit also be-
comes apparent. As in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress
may prohibit a manner of state taxation upon a finding of in-
terference with commerce. A percentage limitation on a tax,
however, is not a restriction on the manner of taxation; rather,
it is a restriction on the states' power to tax. In other words,
imposition of a 121/2 % ceiling on severance taxes is the func-
tional equivalent of degradation of 87.5% of the power to
tax. 56  Such a restriction on the power to tax is
unconstitutional.
b. The Problem of "Sterile" Law
The unconstitutionality of imposing a percentage limita-
tion on state severance tax rates, creates the possibility of
congressional restriction on the manner of severance taxation.
In fact, such an attempt was made in 1979 by Congressman
Pickle's bill. This proposed legislation prohibited state sever-
ance taxation of a resource extracted from federal lands, un-
less such taxes were fairly related to the services provided by
states in connection with the taxed activities. 67 The Pickle
bill raised the issue of whether such a restriction accomplishes
"more than the Commerce Clause of the Constitution would
accomplish of its own force,"'15 8 i.e., whether the legislation is
sterile. Of course, the issue of sterile legislation has become
worthy of consideration in light of recent trends indicating the
Court is defining the scope of commerce under the dormant
commerce clause in the same manner as the scope of com-
merce under the Congress' affirmative power to regulate
commerce.15
9
In Snead, New Mexico correctly argued that its electric-
ity tax was compatible with the dormant commerce clause; 60
if the electricity tax was considered within the state's total tax
structure, then there was no discrimination against out-of-
state purchases.1 6 In rejecting this argument, the Court held
156. See supra text accompanying note 82.
157. H.R. 5294, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980).
158. Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141, 151. (1979).
159. See supra note 27.
160. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfast, 286 U.S. 165 (1932), held that a tax on
generation of electricity did not violate the commerce clause because generation of
electricity was a local activity. Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141,
however, has sub silentio overruled Utah Power & Light.
161. New Mexico argued that the electricity sold within the state was subject to
a 4% gross receipts tax and a 2% electrical energy tax credit. But, the two taxes
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that if Congress explicitly finds that a state tax provision bur-
dens commerce, then the Court's review of such a finding will
be restricted to the statute itself. 6 ' In other words, Congress
may go beyond the dormant commerce clause standards if it
makes such an intention known. Moreover, there is a pre-
sumption of congressional intent to surpass the dormant com-
merce clause, i.e., a presumption of non-sterility. '63
The Pickle bill would have overcome the problem of ste-
rility by addressing "the relationship between the revenues
generated by a tax and costs incurred on account of the taxed
activity . . . . ",i Therefore, the broad interpretation of
"fairly related" in Montana may be avoided. Of course, as far
as the Court is concerned, the Pickle bill would present the
same problem of making complex factual inquiries, which the
Court avoided in Montana. Even though the task would be
tedious, there is nevertheless, an important difference be-
tween setting dollar limits pursuant to a dormant commerce
clause challenge and interpreting the law. The difference is
that it is politically healthier for the Court to make controver-
sial decisions pursuant to a congressional directive. The Court
could freely settle the controversy without political overtones.
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Montana sheds light on the ma-
jority's political considerations. Dismayed by the Court's ra-
tionale of complex evidentiary issues, Justice Blackmun
hinted that such problems have not stopped the Court from
considering other taxes like user fees.' 68
In interpreting the "fairly related" clause of the Pickle
bill, the Court should enlist some guidelines developed by the
commentators in connection with the application of Complete
Auto's fourth prong prior to the Montana decision. 6" There
are essentially three types of costs to state governments cre-
ated by severance of natural resources. First, there are direct
costs which include construction of public facilities, e.g., roads
would off-set each other, resulting in a 2% tax (assuming that gross receipts are
roughly equal to retail value). So at worst, the electricity consumed outside the state
was taxed at the same rate as that consumed within the state. 441 U.S. at 149.
162. Id. at 150.
163. Id. at 151-52. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
164. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 627 (1981).
165. Id. at 638 n.13. Also, Justice Blackmun noted that "there is no basis for
the conclusion that the issues, presented would be more difficult than those routinely
dealt with in complex civil litigation." Id. n.17.
166. See Note, supra note 55.
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and schools, and remedying the immediate environmental
problems associated with mining. Second, there are the costs
of proper management of long-term environmental damage,
including cost of land reclamation and air quality restoration.
Finally, the most controversial cost category concerns the
eventual downfall of boomtown economies upon depletion of
the mineral wealth. The states must be able to transform their
economic bases so as to not only offer a more stable future for
their residents but to also benefit the nation as a whole by
providing new industries. 167
As mentioned earlier, a common theme in the case law on
the commerce clause is that interstate business may constitu-
tionally be made to "pay its way."' 8 The question facing Con-
gress and the Court is for which of the above cost categories is
interstate business responsible. A responsible decision would
include all categories not only for the states' welfare but also
for the welfare of the nation.' 9
B. State Autonomy
Assuming that a federal limitation on state severance
taxes is upheld as a valid exercise of the commerce power,
such federal action may be unconstitutional on the basis of
impermissible intrusion into state sovereignty. In National
League of Cities v. Usery,17 the Court struck down a congres-
sional regulation of commerce which sought to extend federal
minimum wage and maximum hour laws to state employees.' 7 '
Relying on principles of dual sovereignty and the tenth
167.
Further, Wyoming does not have the industrial base or manufacturing
industries necessary to diversify its economic base when the natural re-
sources are mined out. One only has to look at the Appalachian States
to see what happens when the coal industry leaves. Wyoming citizens do
not want to see that type of legacy. And if you recall, substantial federal
investment has poured into Appalachia since 1960 to correct the grim
social and economic landscape that remained when the Coal Companies
left.
H.R. Hearings, supra note 107 (statement of Governor Herachler).
168. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 284 (1977).
169. See Horton, The Energy Policy Game-The Odds on Independence, 9
NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 49 (1976).
170. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
171. Act of April 8, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6, 88 Stat. 58 (1974) (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 203 (1970)).
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amendment, the Court set out a commerce clause test: 72 legis-
lation was invalid if it 1) regulated the "States as States;" 2)
addressed matters that are indisputably "attributes of state
sovereignty;" 3) directly impaired the States' ability, "to
structure integral operation in areas of traditional functions;"
and 4) did not represent an overriding "federal interest.'17 3
The application of National League of Cities, however,
has remained limited; further, uncertainty persists regarding
its meaning and scope. On the one hand, National League of
Cities has been interpreted as the grandeur of the Burger
Court's committment to states' rights. On the other hand, Na-
tional League of Cities has been compared to the Warren
Court's concern with individual rights and a constitutional
guarantee of basic governmental services." 4 Although a dis-
cussion of the possible theories of National League of Cities
is beyond the scope of this paper, the application of the Na-
tional League of Cities test to its facts offers a basis for an
analysis of the validity of a federal ceiling on state taxes.
A limiting bill such as H.R: 1313, speaks directly to the
states, requiring them to levy severance taxes below 121/2 %.
The only discretion left to the states would be either to in-
crease their revenues by other taxes, or to reduce the quality
of their services. Federal regulation of states as states, which
leaves them the choice of increased taxes or reduction of es-
sential services, was one of National League of Cities' major
concerns.
1 75
Moreover, limiting state taxes would significantly alter
the states' ability to provide integral services in areas of
"traditional" functions like "fire prevention, police protection,
sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation.' 176 The
increasing demand for domestic energy has resulted in a no-
ticeable population increase in the western states. For exam-
172. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
278 (1981). Whether or not National League of Cities applies to other state powers is
an open question. But see Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 n.13
(1981).
173. Although the fourth factor was mentioned by the majority, it was stressed
in Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion. See also 452 U.S. at 278 n.29.
174. See Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism
and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065
(1977).
175. 426 U.S. at 847-48.
176. Id. at 851.
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pie, an increase of 1000% in Wyoming's coal production dur-
ing the 1970's was matched by a population explosion of 43%
and a corresponding demand on government services. 77 These
services, however, are limited to basic necessities such as road
construction, education, police, sewers, and hospitals178-- a far
cry from the needs of a "great society." The proponents of
severance taxes are only concerned with meeting the "basic"
needs of their cities and states and are in fact devout conserv-
atives advocating cutting federal taxes. 79 A decrease in sever-
ance taxes would, therefore, substantially impair such integral
services which the states have traditionally offered their
citizens.' 80
Perhaps one of the most undisputed attributes of state
sovereignty is the power to tax. As early as McCulloch v. Ma-
ryland, the power to tax has been recognized as a power in-
herent in sovereignty. The same conclusion may be inferred
from National League of Cities. After all, if the power to de-
termine wages of government employees is an attribute of sov-
ereignty, so too is the power to raise revenue for such wages. 181
The final requirement of National League of Cities is
that no overriding federal interest be present. It appears that
four Justices had a significant interest in mind, namely the
war power. 82 Justice Blackmun, who concurred with the plu-
rality, had a less significant interest in mind, specifically, envi-
ronmental protection. Judging from Justice Blackmun's dis-
sent in Montana, he views matters of energy crisis as very
important 8 ' and would therefore vote against application of
National League of Cities. The magnitude of the federal in-
terest is also considered under a commerce clause analysis. As
previously noted, the congressional record is devoid of any
facts which indicate an important federal interest in suppres-
sion of severance taxes.
It appears, therefore, that in light of all the requirements
177. See H.R. Hearings, supra note 107 (statement of Governor Herschler).
178. Id. See also Taxation of Natural Resources, supra note 15.
179. H.R. REPORT, SUPRA note 56, at 19.
180. 426 U.S. at 851.
181. Note that the power to tax must be affected directly by the federal action.
The Court has rejected the contention that a statute's ultimate economic impact on
states' taxing power falls within the protection of National League of Cities. See
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. at 277-80.
182. 426 U.S. at 871 n.18.
183. See 453 U.S. at 634.
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of National League of Cities, a limitation on severance taxes
"would impair the States' ability to function effectively in a
federal system."'' 8 4 Whether there are enough votes for such a
holding is doubtful.
The split between the conservative Justices in Montana
gives the liberal wing the swing vote. 185 The liberals, including
Justices Brennan and Marshall, may agree with the applica-
tion of National League of Cities, knowing that with the de-
mise of federally funded social programs under the "new"'186
federalism, increased state revenues will be needed. To sum-
marize, it is likely that the Court, using National League of
Cities, would invalidate a federal ceiling on state severance
taxes.
C. Equal Protection and "Free Market"
Although this comment has focused on coal severance
taxes imposed by western states, there are thirty-three other
states imposing various other types of severance taxes. Most
notably, some southern states such as Texas, which oppose
the coal severance tax, collect $1.5 billion of oil and gas sever-
ance taxes annually.' The western states would naturally ask
why they should sacrifice while states such as Texas collect
high severance taxes.' The legal issue is whether a limitation
on coal severance taxes violates the equal protection guaran-
tee of the fifth amendment. Considered briefly, the answer is
"'no."9
First, states are not a suspect class, nor is there any fun-
damental right to impose a severance tax higher than
121/2 % .189 In the absence of a suspect classification or a funda-
184. 426 U.S. at 852. But see Williams, Severance Taxes and Federalism: The
Role of the Supreme Court in Preserving a National Common Market For Energy
Supplies, 53 CoLO. L. REV. 281, 312 (1982).
185. The dissenters in Montana, Justices Blackmun, Powell and Stevens, would
uphold federal action regardless of National League of Cities. See 453 U.S. at 633.
Similarly Justice White who concurred with the hope of federal action, may withhold
his vote. Id. On the other hand, the pro-states' rights Justices, including Rehnquist,
Burger and O'Connor, would favor the application of National League of Cities.
186. See, e.g., Barnett, Reagan's Bold New Blueprint, U.S. NEWS & WORLD RE-
PORT, Feb. 8, 1982, at 20; State of the Union: "Seize These New Opportunities," U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 8, 1982, at 73; The Reagan Gamble, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 8,
1982, at 24.
187. See Taxation of Natural Resources, supra note 15, at 333.
188. Id.
189. But see text accompanying notes 141-157.
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mental right, social and economic legislation are upheld if the
legislative means is rationally related to a legitimate govern-
mental purpose.190 In short, the same rational relationship
test required under the commerce clause is used. Under equal
protection, however, there is a presumption of rationality that
can only be overcome by a showing of arbitrariness and irra-
tionality. 9' The statute's lack of uniform geographical impact,
however, is not strong enough to overcome the presump-
tion.' 92 The only plausible argument is that a 121/2 % limit is
arbitrary.
Even though an equal protection challenge does not offer
a real alternative, the issues presented may have a significant
impact upon the Court's policy consideration. Implicit in an
equal protection challenge is the contention that the states in
their taxing capacities operate in a free market system. Each
state imposes taxes on its exported commodities. Of course,
such taxes are eventually passed on to the consumers in other
states. Therefore, the states pay each other based on their ge-
ographical or socio-economic advantages. For example, port
states impose taxes on imports and industrial states impose
retail taxes. 9 ' Accordingly, it may be argued that because re-
source-rich states and industrial states are mutually depen-
dent, their respective taxes balance one another. Although
this argument is an over-simplification, the Montana Supreme
Court has indicated that export taxes is an economic fact of
life. 1'9 4
The Court's role in the states' "free market" system is set
out in Complete Auto as modified by Montana. The Congress,
also, acts to prevent undue interference in interstate com-
merce. But, in a free market setting, undue interference arises
only when the states are not economically mutually depen-
dent, so that a state can unilaterally increase its tax without
any adverse consequences on its own economy. Therefore,
190. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
191. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59,
83 (1978).
192. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. at
288.
193. 453 U.S. at 641. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The topic of State tax exporta-
tion involves complex economic considerations which are beyond the scope of this
comment. For a detailed treatment, see Hellerstein, Constitutional Limitations on
State Tax Exportation, 6 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1 (1982).
194. - Mont. at -, 615 P.2d at 857.
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when states are economically dependent, they are under local
political restraints. In fact, the guarantee of political restraint
is a common thread running through the dormant commerce
clause and the commerce clause limitations on state taxation
of interstate commerce.'" The substantial nexus requirement,
like mutual dependence, ensures local political impact. In-
deed, the state legislative bodies have witnessed the bulk of
the severance tax controversies. Relying in part on political
restraint, the Montana Supreme Court, in reaching its deci-
sion, took judicial notice of the fact that the opponents of sev-
erance taxes have been "a vigorous presence at any session of
the Montana legislature."' 96
Viewed in another context, states have been free market
participants when acting in proprietary capacities. In such a
capacity, the Court has recognized that the states should only
be restricted by market forces. For example, in Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake,' 97 the Court observed that "[t]here is no indication of a
constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States them-
selves to operate freely in the free market."' 98 In upholding
North Dakota's right to sell cement only to in-state buyers,
the Court relied in part on National League of Cities, noting
that "state proprietary activities may be and often are, bur-
dened with the same restrictions imposed on private market
participants. Evenhandedness suggests that, when acting as
proprietors, states should similarly share existing freedoms
from federal restraints, including the inherent limits of the
Commerce Clause."1 99
It is therefore sensible that when states, in their taxing
capacity, face each other in the free market, they should only
be restrained by the local impact of their taxes. In summary,
as a policy matter, when states tax interstate commerce in
compliance with the dormant commerce clause Congress
should not interfere.
IV. CONCLUSION
A federal ceiling on state severance taxes is unconstitu-
195. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45 n.2 (1939).
196. - Mont. at -, 615 P.2d at 857.
197. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
198. Id. at 437.
199. Id. at 439.
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tional for several reasons. Firstly, there is no rational basis for
concluding that severance taxes substantially affect com-
merce. In fact, the evidence indicates that severance taxes en-
courage conservation and afford the states the opportunity to
diversify their economic bases, thereby benefiting the nation.
Secondly, limiting states' taxes may be unconstitutional be-
cause it degrades the states' right or power to tax-a right
which is beyond Congressional reach. Restricting the manner
of state taxation, however, would evade this problem, but
would leave the courts the difficult task of deciding the value
of the state services to different taxpayers. Thirdly, regardless
of the scheme used, a federal limit on state severance taxes is
unconstitutional because it is an impermissible intrusion into
states' sovereignty. Finally, even though restricting states' im-
position of severance taxes may result in unequal treatment of
the thirty-three states with severance taxes, such restriction
will survive an equal protection challenge. Implicit in the
equal protection issue, however, is the notion that states, in
their taxing capacity, face one another in a "free market"
which may be disrupted when the states are not economically
mutually dependent. Economic dependence restrains the
states because of its local political impact. The guarantee of
political restraint, however, lies at the heart of the dormant
commerce clause. As a matter of policy, therefore, it would be
wiser for Congress not to interfere in the states' "free market"
which is safeguarded by the dormant commerce clause.
Kaveh Shahrokhshahi
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